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Academic analysis and critique of public and private discrimination against 
Muslim-Americans after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has followed 
two tracks. In the first track, scholars have cataloged violations of constitutional 
rights after 9/11.1 This is scholarship as penitential didacticism. By enumerating 
atrocities, scholars hope to quicken sorrow and provoke behavioral change. 
Blending the descriptive and the moralistic, they aspire to inculcate by aversive 
example.2 In the second track, scholars take culture rather than law as their 
target. This is scholarship as kulturkampf. The scholars identify popular cultural 
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Bernard 
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York, which supported the original research. 
 1. The best of this genre bear witness at a granular level to the experience of rights violation, 
see, e.g., TRAM NGUYEN, WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS NOW: UNTOLD STORIES FROM IMMIGRANT AMERICA 
AFTER 9/11 (2005), or provide a synoptic analytic framework, linking current policies to historical 
precedents, see, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 976 (2002). I too have written in 
this mode. See Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in 
LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167 (Richard C. Leone & 
Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007). 
 2. See Murad Hussein, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise 
Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 938 (2008). See generally Tracey Maclin, 
“Voluntary” Interviews and Airport Searches of Middle Eastern Men: The Fourth Amendment in a Time of 
Terror, 73 MISS. L.J. 471 (2003). 
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depictions of Muslims qua terrorists as key catalysts for discriminatory policies 
and attitudes. They thus condemn the frequency of negative representations of 
Muslims and Arabs in film, popular culture, and public discourse3 as an 
invitation to or a legitimation of improper animus.4 
This Article suggests a third approach to the discrimination question that is 
especially salient at a time of fresh terrorism arrests in the United States and 
increasing attention to domestic-source terrorism. This is scholarship as 
epistemological archeology. Rather than looking at what the state does to 
Muslim-Americans or at how the media represents Muslim-Americans, I suggest 
we should look at how the state represents them. In particular, I suggest a focus on 
the epistemic predicates of terrorism policies. North American and European 
governments have recently mapped how individuals decide to commit acts of 
terrorism. Governments term this process “radicalization.”5 While these 
governments have long acknowledged and addressed the problem of terrorism, 
this investment is a new development. This process develops “[n]ew slots . . . in 
which to fit and enumerate people.”6 Investment in “radicalization” modeling 
yields dividends in the form of legitimacy for policies of investigation and 
prosecution bottomed on the state’s claim of expertise. The state’s 
epistemological assertion is especially forceful in the terrorism domain because, 
unlike other areas of risk regulation, from pandemic disease control to 
environmental catastrophes, it is a field where the state claims to have privileged 
access to information and where it has comparatively few academic competitors. 
The resulting state taxonomies merit study for two reasons. First, claims of 
state expertise redirect the vector and intensity of counterterrorism policies, 
particularly those concerning religious speech and conduct. Second, the state’s 
epistemology of religious and ethnic identity also limits and channels 
opportunities for political and religious expression for a larger minority 
population of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in the United States and 
Europe. 
Part I situates this project in a larger intellectual tradition generally 
unfamiliar to the legal academy and explains why that tradition merits extension. 
Part II examines “radicalization” policies on the state level in the United States, at 
the federal level, and then in the United Kingdom. Lengthy, perhaps tedious 
exposition of divergent policies is warranted here given the absence of previous 
descriptive accounts. Part III evaluates and critiques the trajectory of 
 
 3. See, e.g., JACK SHAHEEN, REEL BAD ARABS: HOW HOLLYWOOD VILIFIES A PEOPLE (2d ed. 2009); 
John Tehranian, The Last Minstrel Show: Racial Profiling, the War on Terrorism and the Mass Media, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 781 (2009); Tung Yin, Jack Bauer Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security 
Law, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 279 (2008). 
 4. This work also suggests that new forms of constitutional prohibitions ought to forestall new 
violations. See Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of Race: “Arab, Muslim, and South Asian” Racial 
Formation After September 11, 10 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61 (2005). 
 5. I retain quotation marks for the term “radicalization” through the Article. I do not doubt 
individuals do, in fact, become persuaded to commit acts of terrorism. I use the quotation marks to 
underscore that the “radicalization” under discussion is the discrete discursive formation, not the 
social process itself. 
 6. IAN HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 100 (2002). 
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“radicalization” policy along methodological, political economy, and 
consequentialist grounds. 
I should emphasize at the outset the tentative nature of my investigation. 
My goal here is largely descriptive. I hope to persuade the reader that there is a 
new form of state “expertise” being developed, and that this body of expertise 
warrants scholarly attention. 
I. STATE EPISTEMIC PRACTICES AND STATE POLICIES 
Governments generate policies based on understandings of social facts and 
social dynamics. Like social scientists, governments value parsimony because 
“[n]o administrative system is capable of representing any existing social 
community except through a heroic and greatly schematized process of 
simplification and abstraction.”7 These understandings can be the result of public 
debate and deliberation, or they can emerge from investments of bureaucratic 
time and expertise. In evaluating the risks of climate change for example, federal 
government bureaucrats may look to published scientific studies, they may 
conduct their own research, or they may rely on interest groups to bring them 
information. The epistemic bases of government policy are almost always varied. 
The selection of “simplification[s] and abstraction[s],” their upstream sources, 
and their downstream effects, can all be isolated and studied. 
To target terrorism, a government might wish to start off with some 
understanding of who becomes a terrorist, and how the transformation 
happens.8 For the first five years after the 9/11 attacks there was little public 
information about how North American and European states conceptualized the 
“radicalization” process. But that is changing. In the past few years, American 
state police forces, the U.S. federal government, and several European 
governments have published policy documents describing how individuals turn 
to political violence. The authors of “radicalization” literature attempt to 
construct a descriptive taxonomy of terrorist motivations and interactions to 
enable prediction of future acts of violence.9 “Radicalization” so defined appears 
to be a new object of state scrutiny and epistemological investment.10 
As the state turns to the production of “knowledge” and “expertise,” 
scholarship that attempts to understand counterterrorism must reorient itself as 
well. In turning to epistemology to understand state practice, I am following a 
tradition established by historian and cultural theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault 
argued that “truth” could be characterized as “a thing of this world,” which is 
“centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce 
 
 7. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 54 (1998). 
 8. I do not deny that a government might attend to these causal questions. States fought crime 
and wars long before bureaucrats thought about their causes. 
 9. See generally Aziz Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Counterterrorism (2009) 
(draft on file with author) (discussing empirical problems generated by pressure toward prophylactic 
responses in counterterrorism). 
 10. I have failed to locate any documents from the relevant jurisdictions herein discussed 
predating 9/11 that discuss “radicalization.” 
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it . . . subject to constant economic and political incitement.”11 Elsewhere, 
Foucault explored the relationship between how government acts and 
“discursive formations,” i.e., “statements different in form, and dispersed in time 
[that] form a group [because] they refer to one and the same object.”12 He urged 
scholars to focus their inquiries on “whether the political behavior of a society, a 
group, or a class is not shot through with a particular, describable discursive 
practice” that in turn would “define the element in politics that can become an 
object of enunciation.”13 This Article should be understood in that vein. 
Foucault’s lesson is emphatically not the facile one that knowledge is an 
instrument in the hands of the powerful. In his histories, a diffuse “band of 
experts” organize “lots of hypotheses and prejudices and tidy theories” into a 
“postulated set of rules that determine what kinds of sentences are going to 
count as true or false in some domain.”14 What matters are thus not the rules 
themselves but the conditions that make them count as “true.” These conditions 
enable “[the state] . . . to do something new with people”; one can treat them as 
“disciplinary objects” within a new field of possible identities and categories.15 
Knowledge, on this account, does not repress, it constitutes.16 To borrow Ian 
Hacking’s phrase, it is a matter of “making people up,” not simply controlling 
them.17 
More traditional political scientists have also studied the complex and 
bilateral connection between state epistemological practices and state policies. Of 
special note is the work of anthropologist and political scientist James C. Scott, 
who has traced a history of state efforts “to make a society [more] legible,” i.e., 
more discernable and quantifiable.18 This desire for legibility, Scott explains, is “a 
central problem in statecraft” insofar as it is an adjunct to the “classic state 
functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.”19 Increasing 
legibility, Scott argues, augments a state’s capacity for control.20 The more the 
state knows about the distribution of and variance in social practices, the easier it 
is for it to direct the use of coercive force. As a correlative, “illegibility . . . has 
provided a vital margin of political safety from control by outside elites.”21 
 
 11. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITING 1972–
1977, 131 (Colin Gordon ed. 1980). 
 12. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 32 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 
Harper Colophon Books ed. 1976) (1969). 
 13. Id. at 194; see also EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 23 (1979) (adopting the concept for the study of 
Western texts about the “Orient”). 
 14. HACKING, supra note 6, at 76–77. 
 15. Id. at 79. 
 16. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 11, 138–43 (R. Hurley, 
trans. 1978). 
 17. See HACKING, supra note 6, at 99. 
 18. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 2, 13. 
 19. Id. The process is never aimed at a perfect mapping: “No administrative system is capable of 
representing any existing social community except through a heroic and greatly schematized process 
of simplification and abstraction.” Id. at 22; accord id. at 309. 
 20. See id. at 77. 
 21. Id. at 54. 
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There is, hence, a rich interdisciplinary tradition of studying the state’s 
epistemic bases for public policies. This tradition, however, has not yet been 
extended to the study of counterterrorism policies. 
II. CONCEPTIONS OF “RADICALIZATION” IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
This Part begins by examining the most influential governmental 
approaches to “radicalization” in the United States, which have emerged at the 
subfederal level before turning to federal models. This Part then outlines the 
development of “radicalization” policy in the United Kingdom. 
A. “Radicalization” in the United States – State-level Responses 
The trend in “radicalization” policy in the United States defies the 
conventional wisdom in policy and constitutional law in that it is a state (New 
York) government that has taken the lead in a national security matter.22 While 
the federal government has been a laggard, the first, and perhaps most 
influential, analysis of “radicalization” has emerged in a publication by the New 
York Police Department (“NYPD”). In the wake of the New York study, the 
Pennsylvania Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Commission 
issued a training manual addressing “radicalization.” Because local and state 
police are on the front lines of interacting with most urban Muslim-American 
communities, the analysis adopted by state agencies may be especially significant 
as an index of frontline policies. 
At the threshold, however, federal and state sources diverge on their 
assessment of the severity of the domestic-source terrorist threat facing the 
United States. A decision to invest in understanding “radicalization” implies a 
geographic distribution of terrorist risk where domestic source threats constitute 
a principal share of the policy concern. Part of the work of the “radicalization” 
literature, therefore, is to substantiate the claim that this is a policy problem 
meriting serious attention. 
The National Intelligence Estimate (“NIE”) addresses this issue in a July 
2007 document entitled The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland. This analysis 
picked out the growing strength of al Qaeda in western Pakistan as the principal 
threat. It argued that al Qaeda retained the ability to send agents into the United 
States from overseas.23 The NIE noted a “growing number of radical, self-
generating cells in Western countries” and an expanding “radical and violent 
segment of the West’s Muslim population.”24 But the NIE also observed that 
“this internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe [in the United 
States] as it is in Europe,” and that other “non-Muslim groups . . . probably will 
 
 22. See, e.g., MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 24–39 (2000). 
 23. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST 
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 5 (July 2007), http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/ 
20070717_release.pdf. The National Intelligence Estimate is “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most 
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and 
military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.” Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. at 7. 
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conduct attacks . . . on a small scale.”25 Intelligence briefings produced during the 
2008 presidential election campaign further downplayed domestic-origin 
terrorism.26 Congressional testimony from the National Counterterrorism Center 
(“NCTC”) in March 2009 affirmed that assessment. The NCTC rejected the idea 
that there had been “community-wide radicalization” of the Somali-American 
community in Minneapolis after some young men from that city traveled to the 
Horn of Africa to join the Islamist Shabab insurgency.27 
By contrast, a report published by the NYPD identified a more serious 
problem. It asserted that “jihadist ideology . . . is proliferating in Western 
democracies at a logarithmic rate” and that “radicalization permeat[es] New York 
City, especially its Muslim communities.”28 Unlike the federal assessment, the 
state assessment was cast in terms of imminent and geographically specific 
concern. A subsequent codicil to the report claimed the term “permeate” had 
been used in the neutral sense of dissemination. But the tone and context of the 
NYPD’s assessment suggested that the department viewed Muslim-Americans 
as a source of significant threat. 
Echoing that assessment, Senator Joseph Lieberman, chair of the Senate’s 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, warned in 2007 of a 
“rise of domestic terrorist cells, inspired by but not necessarily directly linked to 
al Qaeda [as] an emerging threat to our nation’s security.”29 Senator Lieberman 
further explained that the threat, in his view, was inextricably tied to the 
Muslim-American community: “We have thought that American Muslims were 
more fully integrated into American society than Muslim communities in 
Europe.” He continued, “I believe that remains true but, obviously, not for all 
Muslims in America.”30 Senator Lieberman is one of the few political actors at the 
federal level to endorse and promote the model of “radicalization” generated at 
the New York state level.31 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, Reduced Dominance is Predicted for U.S., WASH. POST, Sept. 
10, 2008, at A2 (discussing national security briefing given to 2008 presidential candidates, which de-
emphasized terrorism in favor of climate change and resource conflicts as major concerns). 
 27. Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) [hereinafter Liepman testimony] (statement of 
Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Directorate of 
Intelligence), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/031109Liepman.pdf. 
 28. MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (“NYPD”), 
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 8, 66 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NYPD Report] 
(on file with author) (emphases added). 
 29. Transcript of March 14, 2007 U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee Hearing on Islamist Radicalization at 2 (Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman) [hereinafter “Senate 
March 14 Hearing Transcript”], available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=2fb6902f-72e9-45a6-b5b2-15389ed18ec3. 
 30. See Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Efforts to Defeat It Before the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph 
Lieberman), http://www.homeland.ca.gov/pdf/testimony/senate/sga/05-10-07/Statement_ 
ChairJosephLieberman.pdf. 
 31. Which account is correct? Divergent assessments of the underlying risk of domestic-source 
political violence in the United States are hard to evaluate. There is no clear benchmark to set them 
against. The most obvious metric is the frequency of attacks. But this is obviously insensitive to 
fluctuations in the underlying number of immanent terrorist threats within the United States. 
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Corresponding to the variance in threat assessments, the first and most 
prominent analysis of “radicalization” in the United States emerged at the state 
level. The NYPD’s Intelligence Division published Radicalization in the West: The 
Homegrown Threat in August 2007.32 Until that time, the NYPD had never 
published an analytic report, and the change in approach was not explained. The 
NYPD’s Report does not state why or by whom the document was 
commissioned. There is no evidence that New York City’s democratic branches, 
its mayor and city council, sought the report. Nor is there a clear statement about 
how the report was intended to be used. The report vaguely explained that its 
aim was to “assist policymakers and law enforcement officials . . . by providing a 
thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically.”33 But the 
Department added a later “statement of clarification” to some public versions of 
the report, disclaiming any intention to be “policy prescriptive.”34 By rejecting 
any claim to prescription, and by laying claim to a mantle of neutral expertise, 
the report situated itself as a legitimating basis for subsequent policies. 
Moreover, the NYPD report’s tone and content indicated an effort to set and 
legitimate an agenda for “policy-makers” in state and federal political branches. 
Suggestive of this advocacy goal, the report included a series of “Outside 
Expert’s Views” from internationally recognized academics and policy experts, 
each speaking admiringly of the Department’s expertise in “how to detect 
imported terrorists, new converts and homegrown operators.”35 These “expert” 
views, rather than supplementing the analysis of the report, validated its bona 
fides and underscored its aspirations. Presumably, obtaining such imprimaturs 
of authority was not costless. The department’s efforts to secure evidence of its 
neutrality, respectability, and reliability are consistent with a more ambitious 
account of the report’s aims.36 The report, in other words, was an opening bid in 
“the creation of a self-constituting class of experts located within a new 
knowledge.”37 
The NYPD report’s analytic ambition also bespeaks a larger aspiration. The 
authors used a broad scope, documenting ten case studies of alleged or 
completed terrorist conspiracies: five from Europe and Canada and five from the 
United States. But the report has a narrow focus along a different axis: all ten 
case studies were linked explicitly or implicitly to al Qaeda. The sample 
population for the report comprised all terrorism incidents in the world, but the 
actual sample included only terrorism explicitly or notionally connected to Islam. 
 
Moreover, since there have been no attacks in the United States since 2001, the metric is also too 
lumpy to be of much use. 
 32. Rather confusingly, while the August 2007 version of the report remains on the NYPD’s 
website at the time of this writing, a different edition of the report, containing a “Statement of 
Clarification” with responses to critics is available at New York City government’s public information 
site. See http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/NYPD_Report-
Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf [hereinafter NYPD Report II]. 
 33. NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 2. 
 34. NYPD Report II, supra note 32, at 11, 12. 
 35. Id. at 13, 15. 
 36. Consider by way of analogy law professors’ habit of larding star footnotes with credits to 
celebrated colleagues. 
 37. HACKING, supra note 6, at 77. 
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Selection, clearly, was not random, but directed by an interest in certain forms of 
terrorism. 
Elaborating these case studies, the report perceives a “remarkable 
consistency” in the “radicalization” process. The report proposes four stages to 
the “radicalization” process, “each with its distinct set of indicators and 
signatures.”38 These are: (1) pre-radicalization, (2) self-identification, (3) 
indoctrination, and (4) jihadization. In the last term of the sequence, a connection 
between religious belief and terrorism is worked into the basic discursive matrix 
of the report. In a noteworthy rhetorical move, these categories are vested with 
empirical certainty and heft by graphical representations. The authors of the 
report included graphics that chart, with apparently almost day-by-day 
accuracy, temporal transitions of individual terrorists in particular cases from 
one stage to another.39 The level of putative accuracy is surprising given 
concessions elsewhere in the report about the necessarily fragmentary evidence 
of individual motivations.40 The degree of accuracy in the “radicalization” 
graphics, however, is consistent with an effort to establish the aura of academic 
credibility via a claim to precision that underlying data cannot support. 
The four stages of “radicalization” act as a funnel according to the report: 
once a person enters, he or she might not reach “jihadization,” but will remain “a 
threat.”41 This has expansive consequences. Consider the definition of the “pre-
radicalization” phase stipulated by the report. Individuals are “pre-radical,” 
according to the NYPD’s logic, when they live in geographic Muslim enclaves, 
which are “‘ideological sanctuaries’ for the seeds of radical thought”; when they 
are between fifteen and thirty-five year old males; and when they are middle 
class and educated through at least high school.42 That entire class of individuals 
is already in the funnel and thus a potential “threat.” Cashed out in operational 
terms, the NYPD’s analysis means that almost the whole young, male Muslim 
population of urban areas in the United States constitutes a threat because they 
all are in the “pre-radicalization” stage.43 This is, to say the least, a surprisingly 
broad claim at odds with the ambient level of terrorist attacks in the United 
States. 
The body of the report provides case-by-case analyses of ten cases of alleged 
terrorism drawn from incidents in Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Australia, 
Toronto, Portland, Northern Virginia, Lackawana, and New York City. By 
aggregating the case studies, the report claims to identify “typical signatures” 
associated with each of the four phases. The “typical signatures” of the pre-
radicalization phase, for example, are “[b]ecoming alienated from one’s former 
life”; “[g]iving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and urban hip-hop gangster 
clothes”; “[w]earing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard”; and 
 
 38. NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 7. 
 39. Id. at 19, 54; see id. at 81. 
 40. See id. at 10 (noting that the “subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the 
process of radicalization makes it difficult to isolate or even monitor”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 22–23. These minimal definitions, however, are violated by 
the report’s own later examples, which include individuals who do not satisfy the educational and 
class qualifications. See id. at 67. 
 43. Id. at 23. 
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“[b]ecoming involved in social activism and community issues.”44 (A subsequent 
version of the report contained a response to criticism by civil liberties advocates, 
stating that “a greater degree of religiosity . . . cannot be used as a signature.”45 
The main text of the report that alludes to these indicia, however, remains 
unchanged and thus merits analysis). Signatures of the “jihadization” phase, in 
turn, include the undertaking of “Outward Bound-type activities,” and, in one 
striking passage, the ownership of “wilted plants,” which may be a sign that 
“noxious explosives” are being prepared in the location.46 The end of the four 
phases is an acceptance of an “individual duty to participate in jihad” that 
precedes any “operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack.”47 
In the wake of the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania Municipal Police 
Officers’ Education and Training Commission issued a training manual entitled 
“Radical Islam: A Law Enforcement Primer” (the Primer).48 This training manual 
merits attention as an elaboration of state-level operational approaches to 
counterterrorism. The authors did not, however, include an explicit analysis of 
the process of “radicalization” with anything like the NYPD report’s level of 
detail. The Primer’s first section, entitled “Typologies and Misconceptions,” 
instead contains a disordered sequence of terms, definitions, and notes on early 
Muslim history.49 The discussion moves indiscriminately, and confusingly, 
between historical and theological claims. It drifts from doctrinal issues such as a 
definition of the “Sunnah,” to complex theological notions, such as the 
abrogation of early verses of the Qur’an by later ones.50 The manual’s second 
section is entitled “Radical Islam,” and begins with a one-page summary of 
Islamic theology from the thirteenth century Ibn Taymiyyah to the twentieth 
century Sayyed Qutb.51 This section gives the impression that a centuries-long 
sweep of Islamic intellectual and theological development can be distilled down 
to a single thread: the endorsement of violence for political ends. The third and 
final section continues the same theme, identifying “modern radical groups,” 
including al Qaeda, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, that share “five pillars 
of radical ideology” despite the fact that one (Hezbollah) emerges from Shia 
Islam, which is quite separate from and often antagonistic to the Sunni tradition 
from which the others emerge.52 While glossing over elemental differences, the 
 
 44. Id. at 31. 
 45. NYPD Report II, supra note 32, at 12. 
 46. NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 44, 49. “Wilted plants” were seen in one British apartment 
where explosives were being prepared. The report extrapolates from that observation to the 
conclusion that viewing wilting plants generally should trigger concern. 
 47. Id. at 43. Note again the conflation of religious behavior and terrorism. 
 48. Municipal Police Officers’ Education & Training Commission, Radical Islam: A Law 
Enforcement Primer (Bill Kaiser, ed., undated) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Primer]. 
 49. Id. at 2–12. 
 50. Id. at 7–8. The idea of naskh, or abrogation, is complex and long-contested in Islamic 
theology. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 68–74 (1997). 
 51. Pennsylvania Primer, supra note 48, at 13–19. It should go without saying that this is a 
staggering feat of compression. 
 52. Id. at 20–23. This passage also conflates justifications for violence with the more prosaic 
notion of the five pillars of core practice in mainstream Islam. For an excellent account of Shia 
political mobilization, including Hezbollah, that makes plain how distinct it is from Sunni politics, 
see LAURENCE LOUËR, TRANSNATIONAL SHIA POLITICS (2008). 
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Primer’s mosaic of disparate facts communicates the impression that the problem 
of violent terrorism is not linked to a small fraction of Muslims, but rather 
adheres in the structure and dictates of the faith tradition itself. 
B. “Radicalization” in the United States – Federal Response 
Whereas state models of “radicalization” have been powerfully informed by 
a view about the underlying threat level and a normative vision of religious 
tradition—which I explore at greater length below—the federal response has 
been fragmented, hesitant, and incomplete. Assumptions of federalism, at least 
in this domain, are turned on their head. 
No federal agency has published a formal analysis of “radicalization.” 
Congress has passed no law directly relating to the matter. But the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) have separately suggested definitions in the course of congressional 
testimony. In addition, one Senate committee has generated reports that, while 
heavily dependent on the NYPD’s efforts, try to make a distinctive contribution. 
In general, federal responses have demonstrated a more tempered and careful 
position on religious identity. Blanket accusations about one faith’s co-
religionists are few and far between. 
The FBI has generated the least in terms of policy documents. In written 
testimony delivered to Congress in May 2007, an assistant director of the FBI 
explained that “consistent with the First Amendment, [the FBI] defines radical 
individuals as persons who encourage, condone, justify, or support the 
commission of a violent act or other crimes against the U.S. government, its 
citizens or its allies for political, social, or economic ends.”53 In March 2009, FBI 
congressional testimony addressed the possibility that members of Minneapolis’s 
Somali-American community might have traveled to and from the Horn of 
Africa, where they would be ideologically transformed and might be persuaded 
to execute terrorist attacks in the United States. While expressing “concer[n]” 
about the possibility of “recruitment of individuals” to fight in Somalia, the FBI 
testimony recognized “a variety of motivations affecting such individuals.”54 
Unlike the NYPD and Pennsylvania definitions, the FBI thus does not couple 
religion and terrorism tightly. 
 By contrast, other federal agencies have invested time and attention to the 
“radicalization” problem to craft more elaborate analyses. Statements from DHS, 
in particular, suggest it views “radicalization” as a nuanced and fluid process of 
social transformation. Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff declared in 
congressional testimony that “DHS defines radicalization as the process of 
adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or 
 
 53. Violent Islamist Extremism: Government Attempts to Defeat It Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John Miller, Assistant Director, 
Office of Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation), [hereinafter Miller Statement] 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a3a45e4d-
8a9f-4a54-a245-f50743eb1b71. 
 54. Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation), http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress.htm. 
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facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change.”55 Chertoff and other DHS 
officials have suggested that the Department is careful not to define 
“radicalization” in religious terms. They use the term “to encompass a wide 
range of threats against our country, including various white supremacy and 
fascist organizations.”56 Before Congress, Chertoff rejected any equation “of 
violent extremism with an entire religion such as the Muslim religion.” Within 
the faith, however, Chertoff explained that: 
There is a subset of individuals who we have to characterize as violent Islamic 
extremists, meaning that they are adherents to an ideology that is distinctive and 
has a narrative of the world. It is one that at least uses the language of Islamic 
symbols; it may be a perversion of the language, but it uses that rhetoric. And it 
has as a goal acts of violence that are aimed at creating a society that will 
ultimately be radically different from the one we have now, one which is not 
characterized by democracy, freedom and tolerance, but one that is characterized 
by intolerance and totalitarianism.57 
DHS has also taken positions on the mechanisms of “radicalization.” 
Addressing “Islamic radicalization,” DHS’s Chief Intelligence Officer Charles 
Allen distinguished “radicalization from terrorism by emphasizing the difference 
between related social patterns that may all lead to terrorism.”58 In the same 
testimony, Allen cautioned that there “are diverse ‘pathways’ to radicalization,” 
rather than a “‘one-way street’” of radicalization.59 
Ideology, including religious ideology, still plays a central role in the DHS’s 
account. A key part of the “radicalization” path, Secretary Chertoff explained, is 
that “people have to be persuaded” and “presented with a comprehensive world 
narrative.”60 In that process of persuasion, Allen identified “a variety of human 
and institutional catalysts, such as formal and informal religious institutions” 
and “[c]harismatic leaders,” and risk factors, such as “[i]nsular communities with 
little exposure to moderating influences,” and the “deterioration of familial, 
social and societal ties” that may precipitate “radicalization.”61 In the hearing, 
Allen singled out prisons and “university group[s]” as radicalizing hubs.62 
It seems the DHS’s understanding of “radicalization” is in flux. In his March 
2007 testimony, Secretary Chertoff stated that although DHS was taking “a 
 
 55. Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (written testimony of 
Michael Chertoff, Sec’ry of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), http:// hsgac.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/031407Chertoff.pdf [hereinafter Chertoff testimony]; accord Threat of Islamic 
Radicalization to the Homeland Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 
(2007) (written testimony of Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Assistant Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis), [hereinafter Allen testimony] http://www.investigativeproject.org/ 
documents/ testimony/270.pdf. 
 56. Chertoff testimony, supra note 55, at 1. 
 57. Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 5. 
 58. Allen testimony, supra note 55, at 4. 
 59. Id. at 5; accord Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 28 (Allen confirmed that 
“there’s no single pathway. But we did identify nodes” such as “an extremist mosque” or “a 
university group”). 
 60. Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 6. 
 61. Allen testimony, supra note 55, at 6–7. 
 62. Senate March 14 Hearing Transcript, supra note 29, at 28. 
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comprehensive approach” to the issue, it was still working with the academic 
and scientific communities in “[d]eveloping a better understanding of the 
radicalization phenomenon,” through cooperation with British counterparts.63 In 
late 2008, DHS issued a request for participation, asking private “experts . . . to 
participate in a radicalization-research effort” to “systematically identify key 
intervention strategies that can help to prevent or counter radicalization in the 
United States.”64 The Department under Secretary Janet Napolitano, however, 
has not published any conclusions based on that call. 
Evidence about the position taken by the intelligence agencies of the federal 
government, as opposed to its law enforcement arms, is relatively sparse. One 
piece of evidence is a statement filed in congressional hearings respecting 
Somali-Americans traveling to fight with the Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. An 
official from the NCTC stated in March 2009 hearings that the decisions of these 
Somali-Americans were “the result of a number of factors . . . that come together 
occasionally when dynamic, influential leaders gain access to despondent, 
disenfranchised young men.”65 Recruiters offer young men an alternative to gang 
subculture, according to the NCTC, in the form of “religiously inspired 
indoctrination to move them toward violent extremism.”66 NCTC testimony 
emphasized the psychological rather than the religious dynamics of the process, 
which sweeps in “vulnerable” young men, “lacking structure and definition in 
their lives at home.”67 Like the DHS, the NCTC publicly articulated a multifactor 
model of “radicalization” attuned to complex social and psychological nuances. 
Congress, too, has started to take a position in the “radicalization” debate. 
Since September 2006, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (“Senate Homeland Security Committee”), led by Senators 
Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, has held hearings about the problem of 
“domestic radicalization.” The first hearing, for example, focused on “prison 
radicalization.”68 In a May 2008 committee report, the Senate Homeland Security 
Committee adopted the NYPD’s Radicalization in the West analysis.69 Senator 
Lieberman lauded the NYPD’s analysis as a “breakthrough” that “set the 
standard” for law enforcement.70 
 
 63. Chertoff testimony, supra note 55, at 2. DHS Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen agreed 
that “work on radicalization is preliminary and by no means complete.” Allen testimony, supra note 
55, at 5. 
 64. I was asked to attend this meeting. 
 65. Liepman testimony, supra note 27. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Prison Radicalization: are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Prison Blocks?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Sept. 19, 2006, available at  http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=b602edb5-1faa-4011-b12c-c312678d1b71. 
 69. Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat: Majority & 
Minority Staff Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 (2008), 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf [hereinafter Violent Islamist Extremism]. 
 70. Sen. Lieberman Applauds Pioneering Report on Homegrown Islamic Radicalism, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, Aug. 15, 2007, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=350f95d1-d9bf-446e-b6a3-
c3d13df07a56&Region_id=&Issue_id= [hereinafter Lieberman statement]. 
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The Senate Homeland Security Committee’s contribution to the 
“radicalization” literature focused on the Internet. In a May 2008 report, the 
Committee concluded that the Internet “play[s] a critical role throughout the 
radicalization process.”71 In the Committee’s view, the Internet is a bridge by 
which radicalizing influences enter the United States. It is “the most significant 
factor in the radicalization process today.”72 The Internet, on this account, is a 
way for individuals to find and explore propaganda, to become indoctrinated in 
the cause, and to connect “with the global Islamist terrorist movement.”73 
According to the Committee, the Internet presents new problems for law 
enforcement because “self-generated violent Islamist extremists who are 
radicalized online” are unlikely to come to law enforcement’s attention through 
real-world activities or connections.74 The report gives two examples of the 
Internet’s radicalizing potential. One involves two Georgia Tech students who 
made contact with a Toronto-based group via the Internet; the other is the case of 
Derrick Shareef, alleged to have been planning an explosives attack on an Illinois 
mall.75 In both cases, it is unclear whether the Internet played a unique role that 
could not have been played by telephone communications. 
C. “Radicalization” in the United Kingdom 
The British discourse on “radicalization” emerged in a series of government 
documents that outline general counterterrorism policy rather than homing in on 
the problem of “radicalization.” I first outline the overall British policy 
framework and then document the development of an understanding of 
“radicalization.” 
In 2003, the Home Office, the cabinet-level entity charged with crime and 
security policy, adopted a four-prong counterterrorism strategy called “Contest.” 
Details of the Contest strategy, which includes analyses regarding domestic 
terrorism, were released to the public in 2006 and amended in 2009. The Contest 
strategy’s four overarching prongs are: preventing terrorism, pursuing terrorists, 
protecting the public, and preparing the public.76 The “preventing terrorism” or 
“Prevent” strand, implicates the “radicalization” problem. It is not clear what 
model of “radicalization” the British government used up to 2006, when the 
Contest strategy was first released to the public. In early 2005, the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Center, part of the British security services, had developed a “three-tier 
model . . . to describe the varying degree of connection between targets and the 
Al Qaida leadership,” with the tiers corresponding to direct links, loose 
 
 71. Violent Islamist Extremism, supra note 69, at 10. 
 72. Id. at 11. 
 73. Id. at 12. 
 74. Id. at 14. 
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. PRIME MINISTER AND SEC. OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM: THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY, 2006–07, Cm. 6888, at 1–4, [hereinafter COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM], 
available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/136036/countering.pdf. 
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affiliations, and ideological affinities.77 This three-tier model is not elaborated in 
any public document, and appears to have been abandoned. There is some 
evidence that the July 7, 2005 London bombings prompted a significant shift in 
British governmental understanding. According to testimony from the head of 
specialist operations at the Metropolitan Police Service to Parliament’s 
Intelligence and Security Committee, the security services had until 2005 been 
“working off a script which actually has been completely discounted from what 
we know as reality.”78 
Whatever the old script was, it was formally superseded by 2006. The first 
prong of the Contest strategy, Prevent, is now dedicated to “preventing terrorism 
by tackling the radicalisation of individuals.”79 Prevent, in turn is made up of 
three major strands: ameliorating institutional weaknesses and gaps, hindering 
extremists from spreading their messages, and winning the hearts and minds of 
U.K.’s civil society—in particular Britain’s marginalized population. 
The pivotal document in the United Kingdom “radicalization” policy is a 
2006 Home Office paper outlining the Contest strategy. Later Home Office 
papers deal with the Prevent strand specifically, and give further detail about 
“radicalization.” Finally, a 2008 paper generated by the U.K.’s Security Service 
(MI-5) also addresses “radicalization.”80 The result is a rich and not entirely 
consistent “discursive formation.” 
i. Countering International Terrorism. The first official analysis of 
“radicalization” by the U.K. government was the 2006 Home Office strategy 
paper Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy.81 
Publication of this strategy paper came only two months after the Parliamentary 
Intelligence and Security Committee warned that “across the whole of the 
counter-terrorism community the development of the home-grown threat and 
the radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic 
thinking.”82 The 2006 paper can be read as a response to that challenge. 
According to Countering International Terrorism, “radicalization” is the first 
of two steps that may lead to violence. First, an individual alienated from larger 
 
 77. INTELLIGENCE AND SEC. COMM., REPORT INTO THE LONDON TERRORIST ATTACK ON 7 JULY 2005, 
2006–07, Cm. 6785, at 27, available at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ media/cabinetoffice/ 
corp/assets/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf. 
 78. Id. at 30 (italics omitted). Reviewing British counterterrorism strategy in 2004, lawyer John 
Upton identified Professor Magnus Ranstorp of the Center for the Study of Terrorism at the 
University of St. Andrews as a formative influence on U.K. governmental thinking about 
“radicalization.” Ranstorp had a “four-stage process by which al-Qaida’s jihadists are formed. First, a 
recruit undergoes spiritual preparation; then he is provided with basic military and survival skills. 
Following this it is his duty to place himself at the fault-lines between Islam and the West; the armed 
struggle comes last.” John Upton, In the Streets of Londonistan, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 22, 2004. This 
appears to be a different four-stage process from the one offered by the NYPD. What one makes of 
the proliferation of overlapping models—evidence of intellectual ferment or symptoms of 
pathological uncertainty—is unclear. 
 79. COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, supra note 76, at 9. 
 80. See infra 17–19. 
 81. Id. at 5. The paper is a “partial” publication because some parts of the United Kingdom’s 
counterterrorism strategy remain classified. 
 82. INTELLIGENCE AND SEC. COMM., supra note 77, at 30. 
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society adopts extreme views, thereby becoming “radicalised.”83 Second, a “tiny 
minority” of these radicalized individuals become terrorists “by financing, 
lending facilities to, or encouraging active terrorists, or by actively participating 
in terrorist attacks.”84 The paper cautions that “[t]he processes whereby certain 
experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalized, to the 
extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances, are critical to 
understanding how terrorist groups recruit new members and sustain support 
for their activities.”85 But the report adds that this is neither a predictable nor a 
mechanical process: “There are a range of potential factors in radicalization and 
no single factor predominates. It is likely that the catalyst for any given 
individual becoming a terrorist will be a combination of different factors 
particular to that person” including a “sense of grievance and injustice,” “a sense 
of personal alienation or community disadvantage,” and the “exposure to radical 
ideas.”86 
Like the FBI and DHS approaches, Countering International Terrorism clearly 
states that “radicalization” is not a unified and linear concept.87 Rather, there is a 
cluster of factors that may be associated with “radicalization” in particular cases. 
Nor does that study assert a tight nexus between religion and terrorism. Also 
implicit in its analysis is the suggestion that a person who has embarked on the 
first stage of “radicalization” will not necessarily continue on to its next stage. By 
further implication, “radicalization” is not a one-way ratchet like the “funnel” 
posited by the NYPD report. 
While the Countering International Terrorism strategy paper rejects the notion 
of a predictable path to violence, it does enumerate several “[p]otentially 
radicalizing factors.” These include political, social, and religious elements such 
as: globalization and its economic, political, and cultural destabilizing effects; 
anti-Westernism in Muslim countries, fuelled by the belief that “the West does 
not apply consistent standards in its international behavior”; international 
incidents, including the first and second Gulf Wars and the war in Afghanistan; 
personal alienation, or economic or social disadvantage; and exposure to “radical 
ideas” or an inspiring figure already committed to extremism.88 A March 2009 
restatement of the Contest strategy stated flatly that “[t]here is no single cause of 
radicalization” but rather a variety of concerns, including differences on foreign 
policy issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the treatment of detainees 
in Guantánamo Bay.89 This breaks from the NYPD approach, which emphasizes 
faith and personal, psychological dynamics, but makes scant mention of political 
differences. It also supplements the U.S. federal approach, which does not 
 
 83. COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, supra note 76, at 10. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 9. 
 86. Id. at 10. 
 87. Indeed, the security services appear to have reached this conclusion as early as 2004. See 
Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 77, at 29 (work undertaken before 2004 demonstrated 
that “there is no simple Islamist profile”). 
 88. COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, supra note 76, at 10. 
 89. PRIME MINISTER AND SEC. OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE: 
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, 2009–10, Cm. 7547 at 41, 
available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UnitedKingdom2009.pdf. 
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address political grievances. The British approach to “radicalization” considers 
the studied form of terrorism as an example of political violence, while the 
American approach to the data deracinates the problem of terrorism from any 
distinctively political roots. 
But by introducing a political dimension, Countering International Terrorism 
creates a new ambiguity. The report distinguishes a person “who has become 
highly radicalized” from “a terrorist” or a supporter of terrorism.90 That is, 
“radicalization” is not defined solely in terms of attitudes to violence. The report 
fails, however, to define “radicalization” adequately. Should “radicalization” be 
understood as movement along a spectrum of political views or of religious 
views? Countering International Terrorism gives no clear answer. 
ii. The Prevent Strategy. Between 2006 and 2008, the British government’s 
ideas about “radicalization” evolved. In 2006 the U.K. government emphasized 
international dynamics and foreign policy questions. In 2008, it highlighted more 
local circumstances.91 
A 2008 Prevent strategy paper picks out five “interlocking factors” with 
causal links to “violent extremism”: (1) “an ideology which justifies terrorism by 
manipulating theology as well as history and politics”; (2) “radicalisers and their 
networks”; (3) vulnerable individuals; (4) the lack of community capacity to 
resist “radicalization”; and (5) perceived and actual grievances against nation 
and government.92 Psychological and local factors are thus blended with 
international dynamics. In a separate appendix, the document enumerates a 
longer list of factors influencing “radicalization.” This annex treats 
“radicalization” as an individual process, in which characteristics such as a 
“personal crisis,” underemployment, social exclusion, and links to criminality are 
important.93 The appendix further tethers “radicalization” to the presence of 
radicalizing “propagandists, ideologues, or terrorists” and “extremist 
material.”94 
The implicit account of “radicalization” here is closer to the American socio-
psychological model of personal crisis and resolution through conversion than to 
Countering International Terrorism’s effort to take political motivations seriously. 
Indeed, political motives are largely absent. Subsequent analyses of 
“radicalization” published under the Prevent umbrella also focus on immediate 
social circumstances rather than national or international political grievances.95 
 
 90. COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, supra note 76, at 10. 
 91. But the Prevent strategy cautions that “extremism . . . will need to be addressed at every 
level—international, national and local.” HM Government, The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local 
Partners in England (July 2008) at 7, [hereinafter Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners], available at 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/crimereduction029.htm. This at least suggests that 
the British government distinguishes between domestic and international dynamics that propel 
“radicalization.” 
 92. Id. at 5. 
 93. Id. at 69. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Department for Education and Skills, Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working With Staff 
And Students To Build Community Cohesion And Tackle Violent Extremism In The Name Of Islam At 
Universities And Colleges 7–9 (2006), available at http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/hegateway/ uploads/ 
ExtremismGuidancefinal.pdf (noting that, in universities, “extremism can be also disproportionately 
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That change in direction raises a possibility of transnational influence and 
borrowing: did American models of “radicalization,” with their focus on socio-
psychological causes, influence the development of British doctrine? If so, why 
did the latter borrow from the former rather than vice versa? And if the 
borrowing of policies across jurisdictions does occur, is there a set of shared 
epistemic standards to ensure that the superior model is adopted? 
The Prevent strategy leaves several key questions unanswered. First, like 
the Countering International Terrorism paper, it does not contain a clear definition 
of “radical” that distinguishes between political and religious metrics for 
estimating extremism. Nor does it define how “radical” ideas are to be 
distinguished from “moderate” ones.96 Extremists are defined, for example, as 
those who “misrepresent the Islamic faith.”97 But the strategy paper does not 
explain how “correct” representations of Islam are to be identified. Second, the 
Prevent strategy paper introduces a new term, “violent extremism,” to refer to 
what was previously called “radicalism”98 without explaining the new term. 
iii. “Radicalization” on Campus. The term “violent extremism” is, however, 
discussed at more length in a Department of Education and Skills report on 
“radicalization” on college campuses.99 This report defines “[u]nacceptable 
extremism” as a spectrum of conduct “from incitement of social, racial or 
religious hatred, to advocating the use of violence to achieve fundamental 
change to the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom, to carrying out 
terrorist acts.” It cautions that individuals “can and do” hold extreme views, but 
“authorities are concerned [only] with any form of extremism that espouses, 
promotes or leads to violence: ‘violent extremism.’”100 
The terminological shift in British counterterrorism might be an effort to 
concede the legitimacy, if not the wisdom, of variance from median political and 
religious views, while at the same time sorting for cases in which violence is 
probable. The linguistic shift is an effort, in short, to decouple the risk of violence 
from the possession of disfavored religious or political views. This suggests the 
British government’s sensitivity to “the importance of language and 
communication” in counterterrorism.101 
iv. 2008 Security Services Briefing Paper. In August 2008, British journalists 
reported that the domestic British Security Service MI-5 had developed a briefing 
note entitled Understanding Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the UK “based 
on hundreds of case studies of those involved in or closely associated with 
 
affected by the simultaneous presence of a few like-minded individuals,” by ethnic segregation, and 
by charismatic outside speakers). 
 96. To the extent an inference is feasible, the strategy paper suggests that “radicalization” is a 
matter of religious strategy. Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners, supra note 91, at 17–18 (discussing 
strategies for challenging “violent extremist ideology” and supporting instead “mainstream” Islam). 
 97. Id. at 17. This raises two problems. First, does the state have the competence to make 
decisions about what is or is not “correct” Islam? Second, assuming it does, has it communicated 
effectively its understanding of the limits of acceptable Islam? 
 98. Id. at 6. 
 99. See generally Department for Education and Skills, supra note 95, passim. 
 100. Id. at 6. 
 101. See Rachel Briggs & Jonathan Birdwell, Radicalisation among Muslims in the UK 25 (Micron, 
Working Paper No. 7, 2009), available at www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP7_RB_JB.pdf. 
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terrorism.”102 Like the NYPD report, expertise is claimed even as its evidentiary 
and methodological predicates are rendered invisible. The Security Services have 
not released the report, nor is its methodology available. According to one 
journalist’s account of the still-classified note: 
[R]adicalisation takes months or years with no one becoming a terrorist 
overnight, and it is always driven by contact with others. Exposure to extremist 
ideology, whether in the form of online communities, books, or DVDs, although 
crucial, is never enough on its own. Personal interaction is essential, in most 
cases, to draw individuals into violent extremist networks . . . . [Key factors 
influencing receptivity included] the experience of migrating to Britain and 
facing marginalization and racism; the failure of those with degrees to achieve 
anything but low-grade jobs; a serious criminal past; travel abroad for up to six 
months at a time and contact with extremist networks overseas; and religious 
naivety.103 
This analysis echoed the multifaceted FBI and DHS approaches to 
“radicalization” and also a May 2006 U.K. parliamentary Intelligence and 
Security Committee conclusion that “there is no simple Islamist extremist profile 
in the United Kingdom and that the threat is as likely to come from those who 
appear well assimilated into mainstream U.K. society, with jobs and young 
families, as from those within socially or economically deprived sections of the 
community.”104 
III. THE PATHS OF “RADICALIZATION” 
“Radicalization” policy in both the United States and the United Kingdom is 
a work in progress. It is well on its way to coalescing into a series of conditions 
that enable the gathering and evaluation of knowledge. Both governments are 
moving from a standing start. The U.K. government candidly admitted that its 
pre-2005 models of political violence were woefully lacking, despite the fact that 
the United Kingdom had already had long experience with terrorism as a result 
of disputes over the governance of Northern Ireland. The U.S. government 
evinced no such candor. The resulting body of literature raises questions of 
epistemology, political economy, and policy effects. 
A. Epistemic and Methodological Concerns 
First, the “radicalization” literature raises epistemic and methodological 
questions. Unlike social scientists, governments are under no obligation to air 
their methodology and data to public scrutiny and are often able to take 
advantage of a presumption of accuracy, especially in matters such as national 
security.105 Indeed, national security bureaucrats are typically among those 
 
 102. Alan Travis, The Makings of an Extremist, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), August 20, 2008. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Intelligence and Security Committee, supra note 77, at 30. 
 105. See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 
2541 (2006). The most sophisticated articulation of this view is in ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007). 
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viewed by the public as models of “selfless administrators”106 whose claims to 
impartial understanding are quickly credited. And when pressed, the 
government can always reject criticisms by claiming to know more than can be 
revealed to the public. This may be the case even if there are methodological or 
logical flaws in the government’s empirical assumptions. But terrorism presents 
particularly acute epistemic problems: terrorists are not transparent about their 
intentions, particularly to the state; post hoc accounts from perpetrators about 
their motives merit skepticism; and many of the normal tools of empirical 
analysis are unavailable. 
Consider in this light the NYPD and Pennsylvania reports. Numerous 
problems are facially apparent with the logic of the NYPD’s analysis. First, 
several of the “typical signatures” mentioned in the report are pervasive in the 
general population, for instance, the accumulation of facial hair and poor 
housekeeping skills. Treating facts that are pervasive in the ambient population 
as indicators of terrorist risk loosens constraints on investigative discretion. If 
almost everyone is a suspect, allocations of investigative resources may be 
distorted by many factors, including invidious animus. 
A second question arises because some of the putative signals of terrorist 
risk identified in the report are tied to Islamic tradition and custom, e.g., 
adoption of Islamic garb. Recall, however, that the report takes “Islamic-based 
terrorism” as its sole subject at the outset.107 It combines the breadth of a global 
focus with a narrow lens that picks up only incidents that it links to Islam. This 
methodology is known in the empirical literature as purposive sampling, which 
(unlike random sampling) involves “complete discretion” on a researcher’s part 
as to which observations to include in a study.108 Having decided to disregard 
the full spectrum of contemporary terrorist groups and events available within a 
global sample frame,109 and to select only for links to Islam, a researcher cannot 
then assert that the occurrence of Islamic traits or behavior are correlated with a 
dependent variable such as the threat of terrorist violence. To the contrary, any 
correlation is the result of the manner in which the sample was selected from the 
population. 
A third concern relates to the facts of the selected cases. The NYPD report 
mixes studies of completed terrorism conspiracies with incidents in which an 
attack was apparently forestalled; it discusses both realized and potential threats. 
Including potential threats, however, raises selection concerns. A journalistic 
account of the events in Lackawanna, New York—one of the incidents studied in 
the report—has cast doubt on whether those arrested ever intended to commit a 
terrorist attack.110 A plea bargain in a highly visible and emotional terrorism 
prosecution, chronologically and geographically proximate to the 9/11 attacks, is 
 
 106. SAID, supra note 13, at 33. 
 107. See NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 5, 14 (extended defense of the focus on al Qaeda). 
 108. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 105–06 (2000). 
 109. By contrast, a recent RAND Corporation study looked at 648 religious and secular terrorist 
groups to draw inferences about the optimal strategy against al Qaeda in Iraq and elsewhere. See 
SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR COUNTERING AL-
QAIDA xiii (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741-1.pdf. 
 110. See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH JUSTICE 
IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2007). 
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not a substitute for evidence of actual risk. Worse still, some of the case studies 
involve facts in part crafted by the police. In one of the New York City 
conspiracy arrests, police relied on evidence from an informant working for the 
government who encouraged and aided the eventual defendant.111 Questions of 
coercion, entrapment, and the perverse incentives implicated by the use of 
informants are beyond the scope of this Article. But informants are relevant 
insofar as they have influence on the cases chosen for prosecution and the facts of 
those cases. Informants and their police handlers select targets. In the terrorism 
context, informants play large roles in planning and encouraging attacks. In 
relying on cases involving informants—including one in New York City—the 
NYPD report thus relies on facts created by the police themselves. This is a feedback 
loop: the police influence the content and direction of prosecutions and then rely 
on those prosecutions as evidence of the underlying crime problem. 
These three analytic concerns are compounded by the NYPD report’s 
studied ambiguity on questions of methodology. In a section on methodology, 
the report explained that the NYPD “dispatched detectives and analysts to meet 
with law enforcement, intelligence officials and academics” at locations of 
terrorist attacks or conspiracies.112 Despite this, it is hard to link primary 
empirical research to the contents of the report. The 143 footnotes of the report 
contain no reference to any interviews (even with names omitted); instead the 
143 footnotes direct readers to five books, three court documents, and a mass of 
newspaper articles.113 Parts of the report do not identify their sources; nor are 
any non-public sources apparent from the arguments and facts presented in the 
main text. The report does not allow for careful parsing of its empirical claims, 
even though there is no reason why the first-hand sources relied upon could not 
have been identified, at least through pseudonyms.114 
Opacity about the sources of knowledge matters. The manner in which 
knowledge is derived influences conclusions. This is illustrated in Foucault’s 
landmark study of the birth of modern medicine. In that work, the French 
historian emphasized a paradigm change in the manner in which medical 
knowledge was being produced. After this rupture, physicians elevated the 
“privileges of a pure gaze, prior to all intervention and faithful to the 
immediate . . . and those of a gaze with a whole logical armature, which 
exorcised from the outset the naivety of an unprepared empiricism.”115 That is, 
the choice of methodology was linked to a resistance to seeing the possible 
significance of methodological selection. The “radicalization” literature has a 
similar double structure to the one Foucault describes. Reports assert a 
 
 111. See Band of Brothers, HARPER’S, October 2006, at 20 (transcript of communications between 
Siraj and informant); William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens On City Tactics Among Muslims, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 2006, at B29; William K. Rashbaum, Closing Arguments in Trial of Subway Bombing Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at B3 (“brightest bulb”). 
 112. NYPD Report, supra note 28, at 15. 
 113. Id. at 87–89. 
 114. Further, it is difficult in reading the individual case studies to identify any meaningful 
quanta of information that could not have been derived from newspaper reports. See, e.g., id. at 22–28 
(describing first stage of five conspiracies). 
 115. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC 131 (A.M. Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 1994) 
(1963). 
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disinterested, neutral gaze, implicitly asserting a technocratic expertise to 
vouchsafe the resulting conclusions, while at the same time erasing from the 
record all traces of method—traces that would enable critique and challenge. 
It is legitimate to ask whether ambient bias—or even simple aversion to a 
religious faith that is generally unfamiliar and unknown—distorts analytic 
outcomes. Both the NYPD and the Pennsylvania documents tie Islam to 
terrorism at the outset. They posit a categorical linkage between that faith and 
political violence. In this fashion, neither is “mere unconditioned ratiocination”116 
without preconditions because both documents treat the “Muslim” a priori as a 
source of risk and harm. Both extend a long intellectual history that Edward Said 
has most famously excavated, a history that is based on “the ineradicable 
distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.”117 That 
categorical divide is enacted both by the decision to couple Islam and terror in 
the analytic categories and by the sampling methodology. 
Consider by way of example the Pennsylvania training manual’s treatment 
of religious texts and identity. Like the NYPD’s report, the Pennsylvania manual 
assimilates religious motives to terrorism by singling out “radical Islam” from 
other justificatory accounts of terrorism at the threshold. It then backs away from 
this conflation. For example, the training manual states early on that “most 
Muslims are not jihadis.”118 But then in describing the doctrinal tenets of Islam, it 
makes the sweeping assertion that under the Qur’an, “[f]ighting was then 
sanctioned against all those who worshipped others along with Allah” and that 
“it became an obligation to fight against all those who do not believe in Allah.”119 
By stating that “Muslims believe that Muhammad is the best exemplar . . . in all 
circumstances” and then quoting a non-Qur’anic passage in which Muhammad 
orders the execution of non-Muslim prisoners of war, the training manual 
suggests that violence against non-believers is generally endorsed by Islamic 
texts.120 The manual fails to consider the status of the non-Qur’anic passage as a 
binding text, and says nothing about its possible divergent readings. Through its 
description of Islam, the manual also highlights arguments and canonical stories 
that can be used to argue for violence.121 Although the training manual does add 
the caveat that only “[r]adical individuals” will focus on the violent passages and 
ideas, the caveat serves more as a way of fending off accusations of bias, rather 
than a meaningful attempt to dispel the suggestion that these justifications are 
endorsed by Muslims generally. To the contrary, the manual claims precisely 
that. For example, it asserts that “[t]he motivation to engage in jihad is based on 
concepts [sic] that jihad is the ‘best deed’ a Muslim can perform.”122 
 
 116. Id. at 15. 
 117. SAID, supra note 13, at 42. 
 118. Pennsylvania Primer, supra note 48, at 3. 
 119. Id. at 9–10. 
 120. Id. at 10–11. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 16. 
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By failing to mention a large body of literature repudiating those 
arguments,123 the training manual implies that Muslims in general have a 
warrant for terrorist violence in their religious beliefs and texts that is distinct in 
scale and type from the warrant for political violence furnished by other 
religious texts such as the Bible or the Torah. Islam is again configured as 
distinctively dangerous and violent.124 
B. Political Economy 
It is one thing to critique governments’ approach to modeling 
“radicalization”; it is another to explain observed variance in approaches to 
religious and ethnic identity. The second question thus raised by the 
“radicalization” literature, therefore, is one of political economy: even given the 
small size of the sample policies, what can be discerned about the political and 
social forces generating different discursive formations? 
The “radicalization” literature is not the product of disinterested experts, 
but emerged in the context of local and transnational political economies. In the 
United States, it emerged against the backdrop of interjurisdictional competition 
between states and with the federal government. Internationally, it unfurls 
against tensions and negotiations between nations in both counterterrorism and 
other security needs. I have mentioned above the possibility of transnational 
learning between the American and British governments regarding models of 
“radicalization,” which might explain the shift in the British discourse from 
overtly political explanations to more local and psychological accounts. If such 
Transatlantic borrowing does happen, it would be important to know the criteria 
for success in the ensuing tournament of ideas.125 
A political economy of “radicalization” might begin by observing the 
greater influence of British Muslims as compared to their American counterparts. 
Muslim communities in the United Kingdom are longstanding, powerful, and 
organized in ways not familiar in the American political scene. The British 
Muslim community was first comprised of Yemeni, Malaysian, Bengali, and 
southern Arabian migrants who arrived and settled in the late 1800s in port cities 
such as Cardiff and Liverpool.126 Substantial British Muslim populations began 
to develop in the 1960s and 1970s. The number of mosques in the United 
 
 123. For an accessible example of this literature, see, e.g., KHALED ABOU EL-FADL, THE PLACE OF 
TOLERANCE IN ISLAM (2002). El Fadl elegantly and succinctly explains how the texts that the Primer 
focuses on have been peripheral to Islamic tradition, and how they do not provide any license for 
violence. 
 124. This is hardly a unique sentiment in the general culture. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF 
FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 123 (2004) (“Islam, more than any other 
religion human beings have devised, has all the makings of a thoroughgoing cult of death.”). 
 125. The problem of borrowing between jurisdictions is extensively studied in constitutional law. 
See Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005). See 
generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 109 (2005).  
 126. HUMAYUN ANSARI, THE INFIDEL WITHIN: MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN SINCE 1800, 24–30 (2004); 
Hisham A. Hellyer, British Muslims: Past, Present and Future, 97 MUSLIM WORLD 225, 229–30 (2007); 
Ceri Peach, Britain’s Muslim Population: An Overview, in MUSLIM BRITAIN: COMMUNITIES UNDER 
PRESSURE 18–19 (Tahir Abbas, ed., 2005). 
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Kingdom leapt from thirteen in 1963 to 339 in 1985.127 According to the last 
national census (2001), 2.7%of the British population was Muslim. Of that, 
68%was of South Asian extraction.128 British Muslim populations are 
characterized by lower-than-median socio-economic indicators. They also face 
more constrained social mobility than other British immigrant or autochthonous 
communities.129 They are also subject to high levels of racial animus and cultural 
stigmatization. As in other European countries, these frictions often coalesce 
around manifest and visible symbols of difference, such as the women’s use of 
niqabs or hijabs.130 Yet Muslims have successfully entered the professions and 
politics in recent years, and have visible presences in the United Kingdom: in 
2003, two Muslims secured seats in the House of Commons, and five Muslims 
have been appointed to the House of Lords.131 More widely, “[g]rowing numbers 
of Muslims have come to regard formal political mechanisms as an effective way 
of getting their problems addressed.”132 
As a result, it is more costly for the British government than for the 
American government to slight or to be perceived as slighting Muslim interests. 
Instead, the British government claims it has sought the input of its Muslim 
community constituents. In the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombings, the 
U.K. government launched an initiative called “Preventing Extremism Together” 
“to engage and consult with Muslim communities” concerning future policy 
responses to domestic terrorist concerns.133 The U.K. government convened 
seven working groups during the summer of 2007, each directed by a nationally- 
or locally-prominent Muslim leader. Each group drafted a report with 
substantive policy suggestions, case studies of successful community-
government collaborations, and recommendations for legal reform.134 While the 
Home Office publicly welcomed the input,135 the reports had little tangible 
impact on subsequent government policies. Working groups’ leaders later 
criticized the U.K. government for moving ahead with policy initiatives before 
 
 127. Hellyer, supra note 126, at 230. 
 128. Peach, supra note 126, at 20. 
 129. Tahir Abbas, Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism, and Radicalism in the 
Post-7/7 Period, 28 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD. 287, 289 (2007); see also HUMAYAN ANSARI, MUSLIMS IN 
BRITAIN 8–11 (Minority Rights International, 2002), http://www.minorityrights.org/1014/reports/ 
muslims-in-britain.html (describing persistent inequalities in housing, education, and employment 
markets). 
 130. Alan Cowell, For Multiculturalist Britain, Uncomfortable New Clothes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, 
at C3. 
 131. Hellyer, supra note 126, at 233. 
 132. ANSARI, supra note 129, at 18. 
 133. PREVENTING EXTREMISM TOGETHER: WORKING GROUPS, 1–4 (August–October 2005), http:// 
www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf [hereinafter Preventing 
Extremism Together]. 
 134. See generally id. passim. 
 135. HOME OFFICE, PREVENTING EXTREMISM TOGETHER: RESPONSE TO WORKING GROUP REPORTS,  
1–2 (2005), http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/communities/ 
preventingextremismtogether/216937/. 
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even receiving their reports.136 A British security scholar has characterized U.K. 
strategy as akin to “classic counter-insurgency policies that aim to divide 
extremists from the moderate majority Muslim community . . . by engaging with 
moderate Muslim groups . . . [by utilizing] consultations with and closer 
regulation of local Muslim leaders and Imams; and greater contact with Muslim 
representatives to address Muslim concerns over the use of counterterrorism 
methods.”137 Consultations, and botched attempts to consult, are thus well 
understood as part of that divide-and-conquer strategy, and not as genuine 
efforts at gathering new information. 
Concern about the electoral mobilization or otherwise adverse reaction of 
Muslim voters may also push the British government to pay close attention to its 
analysis’s implications about Islam and terrorism. The British government has 
resisted the kind of quick connections drawn in the NYPD report between Islam 
and terrorism. Both Countering International Terrorism and the Prevent strategy 
paper cautiously identify a contingent connection between Islam and terrorism. 
Countering International Terrorism states that “a distorted and unrepresentative 
version of the Islamic faith [has been used] to justify violence.”138 The Prevent 
strategy paper explains that terrorism is promoted by those who “misrepresent” 
Islam.139 Following the lead of these documents, the Department of Education 
and Skills cautions that “[a] clear distinction should be made between . . . 
extremist individuals and the faith they might claim to be associated with or 
represent.”140 The same report observed that “propagating false perceptions 
about the values and beliefs of Islam potentially adds to a vicious circle that may 
fuel discrimination and islamophobia.”141 None of the American literature on 
“radicalization” demonstrates awareness or concern about the possibility of 
populist backlash against Muslim-Americans.142 
Conceptual separation of the main body of Islam from religious 
justifications given for terrorism minimizes any spillover legitimization effect on 
ambient discrimination. That separation also serves a strategic purpose by 
narrowing the perceived constituency for terrorist violence. The “population-
centric” approach to counterterrorism, popularized by apparent successes in Iraq 
in recent years, has prioritized the security of local populations and the 
legitimacy of counter-terror efforts in ending insurgent groups.143 
 
 136. Peter Oborne, The Use and Abuse of Terror: The Construction of a False Narrative on the Domestic 
Terror Threat, in PLAYING POLITICS WITH TERRORISM: A USER’S GUIDE 129–30 (George Kassimeris ed. 
2008). 
 137. Brendan O’Duffy, Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK, 41 POL. SCI. 
& POLITICS 37, 42 (2008). 
 138. COUNTERING INT’L TERRORISM, supra note 76, at 1. 
 139. Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners, supra note 91, at 17. 
 140. Department for Education and Skills, supra note 95, at 6. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The absence cannot be explained by the absence of anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United 
States. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE ARE NOT THE ENEMY: HATE CRIMES AGAINST ARABS, 
MUSLIMS, AND THOSE PERCEIVED TO BE ARAB OR MUSLIM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 (2002), http:// 
www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate/usa1102.pdf. 
 143. See DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA: FIGHTING SMALL WARS IN THE MIDST OF 
A BIG ONE 230–37 (2009). 
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In recent documents, the U.K. government has moved beyond an effort to 
disconnect religion from violence, and has instead drawn on empirical evidence 
that suggests that a deficit of religious knowledge presents a concern with respect 
to questions of “radicalization.” Professor Tufyal Choudhury pioneered this 
argument in an April 2007 paper for the government office for Communities and 
Local Government. In The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation, 
Choudhury aggregated research about why people commit acts of violence, 
focusing on the role of religion.144 Examining studies of groups such as Al-
Muhajiroun and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Choudhury argued that research showed that 
“the path to [radicalization] often involves a search for identity in a moment of 
crisis.”145 Whether because it is intrinsically belligerent or because it provides 
marginalized and disparaged communities with increased in-group solidarity, 
the identity of “Muslim” has proven increasingly attractive in recent decades.146 
Drawing on Quintan Wiktorowicz’s pioneering study of the Salafist group Al-
Muhajiroun, Choudhury also observed that those attracted to marginal religious 
groups “are not particularly religious and do not have any significant religious 
education,” and “a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a 
common feature among those that are drawn to extremist groups.”147 This 
second, more general, conclusion about the role of religious naivety rests on data 
about Al-Muhajiroun’s recruitment dynamics, which might be atypical of 
terrorism groups (especially as Al-Muhajiroun itself disavows any violent 
intent). Further, there is some contrary data suggesting high degrees of 
religiosity among terrorists who self-identify with Islam from their youth.148 
Despite this uncertainty, the paper recommended that “Muslims will be better 
equipped to counter violent [radicalization] when they have the knowledge and 
ideas about their faith with which to confront extremists.”149 
Other governmental entities have reached similar conclusions. The Prevent 
strategy paper flags a “need to develop a stronger understanding of Islam and 
Islamic culture, society and history across all communities.”150 In leaked portions 
of its August 2008 briefing note, the security agency MI-5 listed “religious 
naivety” as a factor in cases where individuals have turned to violence.151 In 
2005, the government-sponsored Working Group on Young People observed that 
“much learning [among British Muslims] about Islam is autodidactic” rather 
than through mosques or family, which creates “opportunities for the 
 
 144. See generally TUFYAL CHOUDHURY, THE ROLE OF MUSLIM IDENTITY POLITICS IN 
RADICALISATION (A STUDY IN PROGRESS) (Department for Communities and Local Government April 
2007), available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/ 
muslimidentitypolitics. 
 145. Id. at 8. 
 146. Id. at 20, 38. 
 147. Id. at 79, 92; see also QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN 
THE WEST (2005). 
 148. See Andrew Silke, Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization, 5 
EUROPEAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 99, 110–11 (2008) (noting another study that found 45% of terrorists 
studied had been religious in their youth). 
 149. Choudhury, supra note 144, at 92. 
 150. Prevent: A Guide for Local Partners, supra note 91, at 18. 
 151. Travis, supra note 102. 
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propagation of extremist ideologies.”152 The correlative to this observation, noted 
another Working Group, was that the Muslim community has a “responsibility 
to try to ensure that the culture of radical ideas and influence” is eliminated, a 
responsibility not generally shared with other faith communities.153 One 
response to the problem is “disseminating a more authentic understanding of 
Islam.”154 Another 2007 report based on focus groups with Muslim Londoners 
identified local imams, many of whom migrate with little understanding of 
Western social conditions and problems, as causes of the vacuum in religious 
understanding. That report explained: “[B]y refusing to engage with young 
Muslims on contentious issues of concern to those young people, [imams] were 
forcing hungry young minds out onto the streets for answers.”155 
A political-economy approach must consider not only private interest 
groups, but also the interactions between different levels of government and 
different institutions within the government. One example of the difference that 
political economy makes in the distribution and form of knowledge about 
counterterrorism is the reversal of traditional federal and state roles in the United 
States. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, it has been a state rather than the 
federal government that has taken the initiative on “radicalization,” sometimes 
seen as one of the most important national security issues of the day. Generally, 
state-level innovation in policy is considered good.156 Not all state-level 
innovation, however, is to be encouraged. Some “incentive to deviate from the 
division of authority is inescapably built into the federal structure,” creating 
negative interstate spillovers.157 The deviations may shift regulatory burdens 
onto other states, or they can create externalities for the nation as a whole. 
Consider one account of the interjurisdictional “contestation”158 underlying 
the genesis of state-level “radicalization” policy. I cannot prove this account. 
Rather, I offer it as a hypothesis supported by at least some circumstantial 
evidence, one that allows for critical examination of the political economy of the 
“radicalization discourse.” The account focuses on bureaucratic rivalries between 
the federal and state level. On this account, the NYPD report is part of a larger 
move to establish the Department’s priority as the premier counterterrorism 
agency within the United States. The NYPD has long contested the superiority of 
 
 152. Preventing Extremism Together, supra note 133, at 18. 
 153. Id. at 23. 
 154. Id. at 91. 
 155. Metropolitan Police Authority, Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate, 59 (March 2007), 
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/downloads/publications/counterterrorism/ctld-22feb07.pdf. 
 156. The classic text on interjurisdictional competition concerns taxation and expenditure. See 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (demonstrating 
that competition among local governments will allow those governments to set appropriate levels of 
expenditure on public goods); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 157. JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 63 (2009). On spillover 
effects, see, e.g., Richard Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977) (discussing spillover 
of physical pollution). 
 158. The possibility of “contestation” between states and the federal government is emphasized 
by Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather B. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1264 
(2009). 
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the FBI in a protracted and “counterproductive bureaucratic struggle.”159 The 
August 2007 “radicalization” report was a preemptive strike in that struggle, a 
bid to cement the legitimacy of a local police department’s intelligence and 
counterterrorism efforts.160 In addition to studying “radicalization,” the NYPD 
has cultivated flattering press for its counterterrorism efforts. This includes a 
New Yorker article that focused almost exclusively on the Department’s 
perspective.161 A recent book on the NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts also 
trumpeted the Department as the nation’s “Best Counterterror Force” and gave 
little space even for discussion of substantial civil-liberties concerns raised by the 
Department’s policies.162 In short, the NYPD report can be read as part of a larger 
campaign being waged for policy primacy between jurisdictions within the 
United States. 
Why should a state fight such a battle? Preeminence has practical 
advantages for individual states. Praising the NYPD report, Senator Lieberman 
added that “Congress must ensure adequate funding” for local law enforcement; 
presumably, the NYPD will be nearer the front of the federal funding line than it 
would otherwise be, given the support of a key Senate committee chairman.163 
But the NYPD’s approach also creates a new version of the spillover problem. 
Specifically, the NYPD’s approach may be attractive because it appeals to those 
with a priori animus against Muslims. Even if the report’s authors are not affected 
by bias, their work may provide confirmation for those who are so affected. To 
the extent that a flawed analysis is as a result adopted in whole or part by other 
states, a higher rate of civil and constitutional rights violations and inefficient 
allocations of policing resources may follow. 
To the extent that the NYPD’s report can be read as a bid for national 
legitimacy, it is also an effort to circumvent local Muslim constituencies. The 
British experience suggests that the presence of a large Muslim population forces 
a government to pay a higher marginal political cost for claiming a connection 
between Islam and terrorism. State governments are more likely than national 
governments to have politically significant groups of Muslim-Americans who 
may take offense at their faith being thus impugned.164 There is also a literature 
in American constitutional law that suggests local governmental units will be 
more protective of religious liberty than the federal government.165 And yet, the 
opposite appears to be the case in the context of “radicalization” policy because 
of a local government’s ability to appeal to a national constituency. 
 
 159. Michael A. Sheehan, Editorial, The Hatfields and McCoys of Counterterrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2009, at 13. 
 160. William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the City?, NEW YORKER, 
July 25, 2005. 
 161. See generally id. 
 162. See generally CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST 
COUNTERTERROR FORCE—THE NYPD (2009). 
 163. Lieberman statement, supra note 70. The NYPD has argued that it has been denied adequate 
funding in the past. See Finnegan, supra note 160, at 65. 
 164. The point is familiar from early constitutional discourse, which recognized the power of 
minorities in smaller geographic units. See THE FEDERALIST 10 (Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed. 1961). 
 165. See generally Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004). 
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Complicating the political economy picture further, Muslim-American 
political mobilization is in rapid flux. The Muslim-American community is more 
varied than is generally assumed.166 The decennial national census does not 
contain a question about faith. This renders it hard to gauge the number of 
Muslims in the United States. Estimates range from 1.1 million to 7 million.167 
According to a 2007 Pew Research Center survey, about 65% of Muslim-
Americans are first-generation immigrants, while 20% are second-generation 
with one or both parents living outside the United States.168 Large Muslim 
communities of considerable sectarian diversity are scattered across the country’s 
urban areas, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, and the Dallas/Fort 
Worth/Houston area. Political mobilization among Muslim-American groups 
dates generally back to the 1996 elections. While in 2000 majorities of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Muslims supported the Republican ticket, and indeed 
were seen as possible pivotal vote banks in Florida and Michigan, in 2004 they 
switched sides.169 One study estimates that they may “have a potential to make a 
political impact in swing states such as Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio” in future 
elections.170 I have postulated above that British Muslims influenced the content 
and direction of British “radicalization” strategy by dint of political voice. 
Analogously, it is possible to imagine that the American Muslim political voice at 
the national level may influence the content of “radicalization” policy in the 
United States in a way that until now has been impossible to discern. 
C. The Impact of “Radicalization” Conceptions on Policy Formation 
The third and final question is whether “radicalization” literature will 
directly affect policy. The exercise of “epistemological power”171 by the state in 
this fashion has the potential to affect the direction and intensity of policy, as 
well as to shape the portfolio of political and religious identities available to a 
larger community of co-religionists or an ethnic cohort. 
In the context of counterterrorism policy, the understanding of what a 
“terrorist” is and—significantly—how someone becomes a “terrorist” impinges 
on the allocation of investigative and policing resources in several ways. First, 
different understandings will influence the use of controversial investigative 
measures such as the surveillance of mosques and the recruitment of imams as 
informants.172 Police will spend more time cultivating religious leaders as 
 
 166. See Farida Jalalzai, The Politics of Muslims in America, 2 POL. & REL. 163, 165 (2009) (citing JANE 
J. SMITH, ISLAM IN AMERICA (1999)) (“Findings dealing with demographics and immigration patterns 
illustrate Muslim diversity in race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.”). 
 167. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MUSLIM AMERICANS:  MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 11 
(May 22, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf. 
 168. Id. at 15. 
 169. Jalalzai, supra note 166, at 171–72. 
 170. Id. at 193 (citing BARRY A KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: 
RELIGION  IN  CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993)). 
 171. See Michel Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms, in POWER 83 (J. Faubion, ed. 2000) (defining 
epistemological power as “a power to extract a knowledge from individuals and to extract a 
knowledge about these individuals who are subjected to observation.”). 
 172. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, How Using Imam in Terror Inquiry Backfired on 
Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, at A1. 
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informants if they are told, or otherwise believe, that religious texts and beliefs 
play a catalytic part in “radicalization.” A model of “radicalization” that 
implicates religion, therefore, will tend to shift the distribution of policing 
resources toward these more controversial measures. Recent changes to the FBI’s 
domestic surveillance guidelines proposed by former Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey illustrate one possible vector for this kind of policy change. These 
amendments relax procedural constraints on the use of direct surveillance or 
informants in religious spaces.173 They enable a new balancing of religious 
liberties against security concerns. 
Second, the “radicalization” discourse may influence front-end decisions 
about what conduct to criminalize, or charging decisions under inchoate statutes, 
such as the material support to terrorism provisions.174 Elastic, inchoate statutes 
may be applied to cases involving religious conduct with increasing frequency if 
the latter is adjudged by the state to be a proxy for terrorist threat. Accounts of 
domestic-source “radicalization” might also distort aggregate resource 
allocations among divergent catastrophic threats because they amplify cognitive 
biases.175 Emphasizing a threat that involves a betrayal of communal confidences 
at moments—on public transport or at work, for example—where a threat was 
not expected may yield different allocations of limited security resources. 
Third, different understandings of the relation of terrorism to religious or 
ethnic identity may alter tolerance levels for ambient discrimination within 
governmental institutions. Supervisors may be less concerned about line officers 
who exercise their discretion in discriminatory ways.176 
Some evidence of how “radicalization” might be operationalized has 
emerged in Los Angeles. There, in response to concerns about “radicalization,” 
the Police Department initiated a “community mapping” plan to “lay out the 
geographic locations of the many different Muslim populations around Los 
Angeles . . . [and t]o take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language, 
culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions” so as 
to “identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be 
susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism.”177 The Los Angeles police 
chief explained that the department also intended to collect information on 
“languages used in a certain area, the employment rate,” and “who and where 
 
 173. See generally The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Intelligence, 
http://justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf. For criticism, see generally Letter from ACLU et 
al., Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/ 20080916.Coalition 
.Letter.AG.Guidelines.pdf. 
 174. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A et seq. (2009). 
 175. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 533–55 (2007). 
 176. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164 (2002) (noting that 
monitoring for bias is more costly when policing is done through dispersed retail decisions rather 
than aggregated wholesale decisions). 
 177. The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 110th Congress (2007) (statement of Deputy Chief Michael P. 
Downing, Counter-Terrorism Crim. Intelligence Bureau. Los Angeles Police Dep’t), 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=483590e6-
9f4e-4aa6-b595-8ca3791e4acb. 
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the city’s Muslim communities are.”178 This mapping project might be seen as 
one way of operationalizing the “radicalization” discourse. The epistemological 
project of understanding terrorism becomes the different epistemological effort 
to know Muslims. 
The plan, however, prompted public criticism from Muslim community 
groups and civil liberties advocates. Citing the “fear and apprehension” 
prompted by the plan’s public disclosure, Los Angeles Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa declared that it would not be put into effect.179 Yet, much of its 
framework has been adopted in a new police reporting system used by Los 
Angeles police to identify terrorist threats via the filter of standardized 
“suspicious activity reports.”180 Just as the NYPD’s “radicalization” report 
influenced Congress, so too, the Los Angeles effort is proving influential within 
the FBI, which is considering adoption of the “suspicious activity report” 
framework.181 
Policy consequences of “radicalization” analysis thus drift between 
jurisdictions. Federalism, far from being a shield for individual liberties, may be 
a cause of erosion of those liberties as local jurisdictions, seeking reputational 
gain, compete to generate tougher and more potentially intrusive policies for 
adoption on the national level. 
Finally, “radicalization” cannot be reduced to a matter of “labeling from 
above.”182 Rather it is wise to recall Foucault’s insistence that power is not 
reducible to domination and hierarchy. As he stressed in his work on sexuality, 
the exercise of power is dispersed, and involves work and investment on the part 
of power’s subjects as much as its objects.183 Following Foucault, one must attend 
to the opportunities that the new discourse of “radicalization” presents for its 
subjects. At its edges, “radicalization” creates a zone of semantic uncertainty 
where symbols of faith serve equally as signals of violence. For the suspected 
classes, that is, “the outer reaches of [their] space as . . . [individuals] are 
essentially different from what they would have been had these possibilities not 
come into being.”184 
So it would be a mistake to conceptualize this as a form of simple 
repression. To be sure, “radicalization” changes the marginal cost of certain 
forms of religious behavior and thereby may create a disincentive to communal 
or individual forms of faith. But “radicalization” also creates opportunities for 
those seeking to establish normative distance from the state. The state supplies 
its own counter-narrative by legitimizing certain forms of resistance over others. 
Rather than repression, “radicalization” can be seen, perhaps not without irony, 
as a path of resistance and individuation through the tailoring of a ready-made 
 
 178. Los Angeles Police Department, Muslim Community Engagement Initiative 3 (Nov. 2007) 
(on file with author). 
 179. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim mapping plan killed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2007, at A1, A21. 
 180. Josh Meyer, LAPD leads the way in local counter-terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, at B4. 
 181. Siobhan Gorman, LAPD Terror-tip Plan May Serve as Model, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2008, at A3. 
 182. See HACKING, supra note 6, at 111. 
 183. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 156–57. 
 184. HACKING, supra note 6, at 110. 
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mold of countercultural resistance. It remains to be seen how these openings and 
resources are leveraged in the creation of new political and religious identities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To understand the forms that emerging approaches to counterterrorism 
take, it is necessary to look to epistemic foundations. The “radicalization” 
literature shows those foundations in the process of formation. Its study 
implicates novel epistemological, political-economy, and legal questions. Further 
research is needed to understand this new, and increasingly significant, 
determinant of counterterrorism policy. 
 
